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3.SCIENCE AND
HUMAN VALUES
1. THE PROBLEM
UR AGE is often called an age of science and of scientific technology,
Oand with good reason: the advances made during the past few centuries
bythenaturalsciences,and more recently by the psychological and sociological
disciplines,have enormously broadened our knowledge and deepened our
understandingof the world we live in and of our fellow men; and the practical
applicationofscientificinsights is giving us an ever increasing measure of control
overtheforcesof nature and the minds of men. As a result, we have grown quite
accustomed,not only to the idea of a physico-chemical and biological tech­
nologybasedon the results of the natural sciences, but also to the concept, and
indeedthe practice,of a psychological and sociological technology that utilizes
thetheoriesand methods developed by behavioral research.
Thisgrowth of scientific knowledge and its applications has vastly reduced
thethreatof some of man’s oldest and most formidable scourges, among them
famineand pestilence; it has raised man’s material level of living, and it has put
withinhisreach the realization of visions which even a few decades ago would
haveappearedutterly fantastic, such as the active exploration of interplanetary
space.
Butin achieving these results, scientific technology has given rise to a host
ofnewandprofoundly disturbing problems: The control of nuclear fission has
broughtusnot only the comforting prospect of a vast new reservoir of energy,
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but also the constant threat of the atom bomb and of grave damage,tothepresent
and to future generations, from the radioactive by-products of the fissionprocess.
even in its peaceful uses. And the very progress in biological and medicalknowl­
edge and technology which has so strikingly reduced infant mortalityandin­
creased man’s life expectancy in large areas of our globe has signihcantlycon­
tributed to the threat of the “population explosion," the rapid gIOWthofthe
earth's population which we are facing today, and which, again, is a matterof
grave concern to all those who have the welfare of future generationsatheart.
Clearly, the advances of scientific technology on which we pride ourselves.
and which have left their characteristic imprint on every aspectof this“age0f
science,” have brought in their train many new and grave problemswhiCh
urgently demand a solution. It is only natural that, in his desire tocopewiththcsc
new issues, man should turn to science and scientific technology for furtherhelp.
But a moment's reflection shows that the problems that need to be dealtwith
are not straightforward technological questions but intricate Complexesof
technological and moral issues. Take the case of the population explosion,for
example. To be sure, it does pose specific technological problems. One ofth¢5c
is the task of satisfying at least the basic material needs of a rapidly growing
population by means of limited resources; another is the question of meansby
which population growth itself may be kept under control. Yet thesetechnical
questions do not exhaust the problem. For after all, even now we haveat our
disposal various ways of counteracting population growth; but someof these.
notably contraceptive methods, have been and continue to be the subjectof
intense controversy on moral and religious grounds, which shows that an aide“
quate solution of the problem at hand requires, not only knowledge of technical
means of control, but also standards for evaluating the alternative meansat 0“I
disposal; and this second requirement clearly raises moral issues.
There is no need to extend the list of illustrations: any means of technical
control that science makes available to us may be employed in many different
ways, and a decision as to what use to make of it involves us in questionsofmoral
valuation. And here arises a fundamental problem to which I would now like
to turn: Can such valuational questions be answered by means of the objectch
methods of empirical science, which have been so successful in giving usreliable.
and often practically applicable, knowledge of our world? Can those methods
serve to establish objective criteria of right and wrong and thus to providevalid
moral norms for the proper conduct of our individual and socialaffairs:
2. SCIENTIFIC TESTING
Let us approach this question by considering first, if only in brief and sketchy
outline, the way in which objective scientific knowledge is arrived at. We may
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leaveasidehere the question of ways of discovery; i.e., the problem of how a new
scientificideaarises,how a novel hypothesis or theory is first conceived; for our
purposesit will suffice to consider the scientific ways of validation,' i.e., the manner
inwhichempirical science goes about examining a proposed new hypothesis
anddetermineswhether it is to be accepted or rejected. I will use the word
‘hypothesis'here to refer quite broadly to any statements or set of statements in
empiricalscience, no matter whether it deals with some particular event or
purportsto set forth a general law or perhaps a more or less complex theory.
Asiswellknown, empirical science decides upon the acceptability of a pro­
posedhypothesisby means of suitable tests. Sometimes such a test may involve
nothingmore than what might be called direct observation of pertinent facts.
Thisproceduremay be used, for example, in testing such statements as “It is
rainingoutside,” “All the marbles in this urn are blue," “The needle of this
ammeterwill stop at the scale point marked 6," and so forth. Here a few direct
observationswill usually suffice to decide whether the hypothesis at hand is to be
acceptedas true or to be rejected as false.
Butmostof the important hypotheses in empirical science cannot be tested
inthissimplemanner. Direct observation does not suffice to decide, for example,
whetherto accept or to reject the hypotheses that the earth is a sphere, that
hereditarycharacteristics are transmitted by genes, that all Indo—European
languagesdeveloped from one common ancestral language, that light is an
electromagneticwave process, and so forth. With hypotheses such as these,
scienceresortsto indirect methods of test and validation. While these methods
varygreatlyinprocedural detail, they all have the same basic structure and ration­
ale.First,from the hypothesis under test, suitable other statements are inferred
whichdescribecertain directly observable phenomena that should be found to
occurunderspecifiablecircumstances if the hypothesis is true; then those inferred
statementsaretested directly; i.e., by checking whether the specified phenomena
doinfactoccur; finally, the proposed hypothesis is accepted or rejected in the
lightof the outcome of these tests. For example, the hypothesis that the earth
issphericalin shape is not directly testable by observation, but it permits us to
inferthata shipmoving away from the observer should appear to be gradually
droppingbelow the horizon; that circumnavigation of the earth should be
possibleby following a straight course; that high-altitude photographs should
showthecurving of the earth’s surface; that certain geodetic,and astronomical
measurementshould yield such and such results; and so forth. Inferred state­
mentssuchasthese can be tested more or less directly; and as an increasing num­
berandvarietyof them are actually borne out, the hypothesis becomes increas­
inglyconfirmed. Eventually, a hypothesis may be so well confirmed by the
availablevidencethat it is accepted as having been established beyond reasonable
[84] CONFIRMATION, INDUCTION, AND RATIONAL BELIEF
doubt. Yet no scientific hypothesis is ever proved completely and definitively;
there is always at least the theoretical possibility that new evidence will be dis­
covered which conflicts w-ithsome of the observational statements inferredfrom
the hypothesis, and which thus leads to its rejection. The history of science
records many instances in which a once accepted hypothesis was subsequently
abandoned in the light of adverse evidence.
3. INSTRUMENTAL JUDGMENTS OF VALUE
We now turn to the question whether this method of test and validationmay
be used to establishmoral judgements of value, and particularlyjudgments to the
effect that a specified course of action is good or right or proper, or that it is
better than certain alternative courses of action, or that we ought—or oughtnot—­
to act in certain specified ways.
By way of illustration, consider the view that it is good to raise children
permissiver and bad to bring them up in a restrictive manner. It might seem
that, at least in principle, this View could be scientifically confirmed by appro'
priate empirical investigations. Suppose, for example, that careful researchhad
established (1) that restrictive upbringing tends to generate resentment and
aggression against parents and other persons exercising educational authority.
and that this leads to guilt and anxiety and an eventual stunting of the child's
initiative and creative potentialities; whereas (2) permissive upbringing avoid5
these consequences, makes for happier interpersonal relations, encourages
resourcefulness and self-reliance, and enables the child to develop and enjoy his
potentialities. These statements, especiallywhen suitably amplified, comewithin
the purview of scientific investigation; and though our knowledge in thematter
is in fact quite limited, let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that theyhad
actually been strongly confirmed by careful tests. Would not scientificresearch
then have objectively shown that it is indeed better to raise children in a per­
missive rather than in a restrictive manner?
A moment’s reflection shows that this is not so. What would have been
established is rather a conditional statement; namely, that our childrenareto
become happy, emotionally secure, creative individuals rather than guilt­
ridden and troubled souls then it is better to raise them in a permissive than ina
restrictive fashion. A statement like this represents a relative, or instrumental,
judgment ofvalue.Generally, a relative judgment of value states that a certainkind
of action, M, is good (or that it is better than a given alternative M1)a specified
goal G is to be attained; or more accurately, that M is good, or appropriate, for
the attainment of goal G. But to say this is tantamount to asserting either that,
in the circumstances at hand, course of action M will defmitely (or probably)
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leadtotheattainmentof G, or that failure to embark on course of action M will
definitely(or probably) lead to the nonattainment of G. In other words, the
instrumentalvaluejudgment asserts either that M is a (definitely or probably)
sufficientmeans for attaining the end or goal G, or that it is a (definitely or
probably)necessarymeans for attaining it. Thus, a relative, or instrumental,
judgmentofvaluecan be reformulated as a statement which expresses a universal
oraprobabilistickind of means-ends relationship, and which contains no terms
ofmoraldiscourse—suchas ‘good,’ ‘better,’ ‘ought to'— at all. And a statement
ofthiskindsurelyis an empirical assertion capable of scientific test
4.CATEGORICALjUDGMENTS OF VALUE
Unfortunately,this does not completely solve our problem; for after a relative
judgmentofvaluereferring to a certain goal G has been tested and, let us assume,
wellconfirmed,we are still left with the question of whether the goal G ought
tobepursued,or whether it would be better to aim at some alternative goal
instead.Empiricalscience can establish the conditional statement, for example,
thatifwewishto deliver an incurany ill person from intolerable suffering, then
alargedoseof morphine affords a means of doing so; but it may also indicate
waysofprolonging the patient's life, if also his suffering. This leaves us with the
questionwhetherit is right to give the goal of avoiding hopeless human suffering
precedenceover that of preserving human life. And this question calls, not for a
relativebut for an absolute,or categorical,judgmcnt of value to the effect that a certain
stateofaffairs(which may have been proposed as a goal or end) is good, or that
itisbetterthan some specified alternative. Are such categorical value judgments
capableof empirical test and confirmation?
Consider,for example, the sentence “Killing is evil." It expresses a categorical
judgmentof value which, by implication, would also categorically qualify
euthanasiasevil. Evidently, the sentence does not express an assertion that can
bedirectlytestedby observation; it does not purport to describe a directly observ­
ablefact. Can it be indirectly tested, then, by inferring from it statements
to the effect that under specified test conditions such and such observable
phenomenawill occur? Again, the answer is clearly in the negative. Indeed,
the sentence ‘Killing is evil’ does not have the function of expressing an
assertionthat can be qualified as true or false; rather, it serves to express a
standardfor moral appraisal or a norm for conduct. A categorical judgment of
valuemay have other functions as well; for example, it may serve to convey
theutterer’sapproval or disapproval of a certain kind of action, or his commit­
mentto the standards of conduct expressed by the value judgment. Descriptive
empiricalimport, however, is absent; in this respect a sentence such as “Killing
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isevil’ differs strongly from, say, ‘Killing iscondemned as evil by many religions.
which expresses a factual assertion capable of empirical test.
Categorical judgements of value, then, are not amenable to scientifictest
and confirmation or disconfirmation; for they do not express assertionsbut
rather standards or norms for conduct. It was Max Weber, I believe,who expres­
sed essentially the same idea by remarking that science is like a map: it cantell
us how to get to a given place, but it cannot tell us where to go. GunnarMyrdal.
in his book An American Dilemma (p. 1052), stresses in a similar vein that “factual
or theoretical studies alone cannot logically lead to a practical recommendation.
A practical or valuational conclusion can be derived only when there is at least
one valuation among the premises."
Nevertheless, there have been many attempts to base systems of m0f31
standards on the findings of empirical science; and it would be of interestto
examine in some detail the reasoning which underlies those procedures.In the
present context, however, there is room for only a few brief remarks on thiS
subject.
It might seem promising, for example, to derive judgments of valuefrom
the results of an objective study of human needs. But no cogent derivationof
this sort is possible. For this procedure would presuppose that it is right, or good,
to satisfy human needs—and this presupposition is itself a categoricaljudgmentof
value: it would play the role of a valuational premise in the senseof Myt'dal’S
statement. Furthermore, since there are a great many different, and partly
confiicting, needs of individuals and of groups, we would require not just the
general maxim that human needs ought to be satisfied, but a detailed set of
rules as to the preferential order and degree in which different needs are to be
met, and how conflicting claims are to be settled; thus, the valuational premise
required for this undertaking would actually have to be a complex systemof
norms; hence, a derivation of valuational standards simply from a factualstudy
of needs is out of the question.
Several systems of ethics have claimed the theory of evolution as their
basis; but they are in serious conHict with each other even in regard to theirmost
fundamental tenets. Some of the major variants are illuminatineg surveyedin
a chapter of G. G. Simpson's book, The Meaning qfEvolution. One type, which
Simpson calls a “tooth-and-claw ethics," glorifies a struggle for eidstencethat
should lead to a survival of the fittest. A second urges the harmonious adjustment
of groups or individuals to one another so as to enhance the probability of their
survival, while still other systems hold up as an ultimate standard the increased
aggregation of organic units into higher levels of organization, sometimeswith
the implication that the welfare of the state is to be placed above that of the
individuals belonging to it. It is obvious that these confiicting principles could
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nothavebeenvalidly inferred'from the theory of evolution—unless indeed that
theorywere self-contradictory, which does not seem very likely.
Butif sciencecannot provide us with categorical judgments of value, what
thencanserveas a source of unconditional valuationse This question may either
beunderstoodin a pragmatic sense, as concerned with the sources from which
humanbeingsdo in fact obtain their basic values. Or it may be understood as
concernedwith a systematic aspect of valuation; namely, with the question
whereapropersystem of basic values is to be found on which all other valuations
maythenbe grounded.
The pragmatic question comes within the purview of empirical science.
Withoutentering into details, we may say here that a person’s values—both
thosehe professesto espouse and those he actually conforms to—are largely
absorbedfrom the society in which he lives, and especially from certain influen­
tialsubgroupsto which he belongs, such as his family, his schoolmates, his
associateson the job, his church, clubs, unions, and other groups. Indeed his
valuesmayvary from case to case depending on which of these groups dominates
thesituationin which he happens to find himself. In general, then, a person's
basicvaluationsare no more the result of careful scrutiny and critical appraisal
ofpossiblealternatives than ishis religious affiliation. Conformity to the standards
ofcertaingroupsplays a very important role here, and only rarely are basic values
seriouslyquestioned. Indeed, in many situations, we decide and act unreflectively
inanevenstronger sense; namely, without any attempt to base our decisions on
somesetof explicit, consciously adopted, moral standards.
Now,it mightbe held that this answer to the pragmatic versionof our question
reflectsa regrettable human inclination to intellectual and moral inertia; but
thatthereallyimportant side of our question is the systematic one: Ifwe do want
tojustifyourdecisions,we need moral standards of conduct of the unconditional
type—buthow can such standards be established? If science cannot provide cate­
goricalvaluejudgments, are there any other sources from which they might
beobtained?Could we not, for example, validate a system of categorical judg­
mentsof valueby pointing out that it represents the moral standards held up by
theBible,or by the Koran, or by some inspiring thinker or social leader? Clearly,
thisproceduremust fail, for the factual information here adduced could serve
tovalidatethe value judgments in question only if we were to use, in addition,
a valuationalpresupposition to the effect that the moral directives stemming
fromthe source invoked ought to be complied with. Thus, if the process of
justifyinga given decision or a moral judgment is ever to be completed,certain
judgmentsof value have to be accepted without any further justification, just
astheproofofa theorem in geometry requires that some propositions be accepted
aspostulates,without proof. The quest for a justification of all our valuations
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overlooks this basic characteristic of the logic of validation and ofjustification.
The value judgments accepted without further justification in a given context
need not, however, be accepted once and for all, with a commitment neverto
question them again. This point will be elaborated further in the finalsectionof
this essay.
As will hardly be necessary to stress, in concluding the present phaseofour
discussion, the ideas set forth in the preceding pages do not imply or advocate
moral anarchy; in particular, they do not imply that any system of valuesisjust
as good, or just as valid, as any other, or that everyone should adopt the moral
principles that best suit his convenience. For all such maxims have the characttrr
of categorical value judgments and cannot, therefore, be implied by the pre­
ceding considerations, which are purely descriptive of certain logical,psycho­
logical, and social aspects of moral valuation.
5. RATIONAL CHOICE: EMPIRICAL AND VALUATIONAL
COMPONENTS
To gain further insight into the relevance of scientific inquiry for categorical
valuation let us ask what help we might receive, in dealing with a moralproblem.
from science in an ideal state such as that represented by Laplace’sconceptionof
a superior scientific intelligence, sometimes referred to as Laplace’sdemon.
This fiction was used by Laplace, early in the nineteenth century, to givea vivid
characterization of the idea of universal causal determinism. The demonis
conceived as a perfect observer, capable of ascertaining with infinite speed
and accuracy all that goes on in the universe at a given moment; he is alsoan
ideal theoretician who knows all the laws of nature and has combined theminto
one universal formula; and finally, he is a perfect mathematician who, by means
of that universal formula, is able to infer, from the observed state of the universe
at the given moment, the total state of the universe at any other moment; thus
past and future are present before his eyes. Surely, it is difficult to imagine that
science could ever achieve a higher degree of perfection!
Let us assume, then, that, faced with a moral decision, we are able to callupon
the Laplacean demon as a consultant. What help might we get from him?
Suppose that we have to choose one of several alternative courses of actionopen
to us, and that we want to know which of these we oughtto follow. The demon
would then be able to tell us, for any contemplated choice, what its consequences
would be for the future course of the universe, down to the most minute detail,
however remote in space and time. But, having done this for each of the alter­
native courses of action under consideration, the demon would have completed
his task: he would have given us all the information that an ideal sciencemight
provide under the circumstances. And yet he would not have resolved our moral
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problem,for this requires a decision as to which of the several alternative sets of
consequencesmapped out by the demon as attainable to us is the best; which of
themweought to bring about. And the burden of this decision would still fall
uponourshoulders:it is we who would have to commit ourselves to an uncon­
ditionaljudgmentof value by singling out one of the sets of consequences as
superiorto its alternatives. Even Laplace’s demon, or the ideal science he stands
for,cannotrelieve us of this responsibility.
Indrawingthis picture of the Laplacean demon as a consultant in decision­
making,I have cheated a little; for if the world were as strictly deterministic
asLaplace’sfretion assumes, then the demon would know in advance what
choicewewere going to make, and he might disabuse us of the idea that there
wereseveralcoursesof action open to us. However that may be, contemporary
physicaltheory has cast considerable doubt on the classical conception of the
universeasa strictly deterministic system: the fundamental laws of nature are
nowassumedto have a statistical or probabilistic rather than a strictly universal,
deterministic,character.
Butwhatevermay be the form and the scope of the laws that hold in our
universe,wewillobviously never attain a perfect state of knowledge concerning
them;confrontedwith a choice, we never have more than a very incomplete
knowledgeof the laws of nature and of the state of the world at the time when
wemustact. Our decisions must therefore always be made on the basis of in­
completeinformation, a state which enables us to anticipate the consequences of
alternativechoicesat best with probability. Science can render an indispensable
serviceby providing us with increasingly extensive and reliable information
relevanto our purpose; but again it remains for us to evaluate the various
probablesetsof consequences of the alternative choices under consideration.
Andthisrequires the adoption of pertinent valuational standards which are
notobjectivelydetermined by the empirical facts.
Thisbasicpoint is reflected also in the contemporary mathematical theories
ofdecision-making.One of the objectives of these theories is the formulation
ofdecisionrules which will determine an optimal choice in situations where
severalcoursesof action are available. For the formulation of decision rules,
thesetheoriesrequire that at least two conditions be met: (1) Factual information
mustbe provided specifying the available courses of action and indicating for
eachof theseits different possible outcomes—plus, if feasible, the probabilities
oftheiroccurrence;(2) there must be a specification of the values—often prosai­
callyreferredto as utilities—that are attached to the different possible outcomes.
Onlywhenthesefactual and valuational specifications have been provided does
itmakesenseto ask which of the available choices is the best, considering the
valuesattaching to their possible results.
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In mathematical decision theory, several criteria of optimal choicehavebeen
proposed. In case the probabilities for the different outcomes of eachactionare
given, one standard criterion qualifies a choice as optimal if the probabilistically
expectable utility of its outcome is at least as great as that of any alternative
choice. Other rules, such as the maximin and the maximax principles,providc
criteria that are applicable even when the probabilities of the outcomesarenot
available. But interestingly, the various criteria conflict with each other inthf
sense that, for one and the same situation, they will often select differentchoices
as optimal.
The policies expressed by the conflicting criteria may be regarded asreflecting
different attitudes towards the world, different degrees of optimism orpessimism,
of venturesomcness or caution. It may be said therefore that the analysisoffered
by current mathematical models indicates two points at which decision-making
calls not solely for factual information, but for categorical valuation, namely.
in the assignment of utilities to the different possible outcomes and in theadop­
tion of one among many competing decision rules or criteria of optimalchoice­
(This topic is developed in more detail in section 10.2 of the essay “ASPCCts0f
ScientificExplanation" in this volume.)
6. VALUATIONAL “PRESUPPOSITIONS” OF SCIENCE
The preceding three sections have been concerned mainly with the question
whether, or to what extent, valuation and decision presuppose scientificinvestiga­
tion and scientific knowledge. This problem has a counterpart which deserves
some attention in a discussion of science and valuation; namely, the question
whether scientific knowledge and method presuppose valuation.
The word “presuppose” may be understood in a number of diEerentsenses
which require separate consideration here. First of all, when a person decides
to devote himself to scientific work rather than to some other career,andagain.
when a scientist chooses some particular topic of investigation, thesechoiceswill
presumably be determined to a large extent by his preferences, i.e., by how
highly he values scientific research in comparison with the alternativesopento
him, and by the importance he attaches to the problems he proposes to investi­
gate. In this explanatory, quasi-causal sense the scientific activitiesof human beings
may certainly be said to presuppose valuations.
Much more intriguing problems arise, however, when we ask whether
judgments of value are presupposed by the body of scientific knowledge,which
might be represented by a system of statements accepted in accordancewith the
rules of scientific inquiry. Here presupposing has to be understood in asystematic­
logical sense. One such sense is invoked when we say, for example, that the
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statement‘Henry’s brother-in—law is an engineer’ presupposes that Henry has
awifeor asister: in this sense, a statement presupposes whatever can be logically
inferredfrom it. But, as was noted earlier, no set of scientific statements logically
impliesan unconditional judgment of value; hence, scientific knowledge does
n0t,in this sense, presuppose valuation.
Thereis another logical sense of presupposing, however. We might say,
forexample,that in Euclidean geometry the angle—sum theorem for triangles
presupposesthe postulate of the parallels in the sense that that postulate is an
essentialpart of the basic assumptions from which the theorem is deduced.
Now,thehypothesesand theories of empirical science are not normally validated
bydeductionfrom supporting evidence (though it may happen that a scientific
statement,such as a prediction, is established by deduction from a previously
ascertained,more inclusive set of statements); rather, as was mentioned in
section2, they are usually accepted on the basis of evidence that lends them only
partial,or “inductive,”support. But in any event it Mghtbgaskmhether
thestatementsrepresenting scientifiolgnowledgg presuppose valuation in the
senseElia—ithegroundi on which they. arcvaccgptcdanyég,sometimes oralways,
u~vv.~.":,‘.._i,,.~. »v~..-._”,, ,a... _,._....
certiinuncenditLQnaHJ-Ldamlofsyalue.Againsheanswsgiaiulbinsganve.
Themwnwhjchscientifiehypothesesare agccgtcdpirsjccted.arcprovided
byempiricalevidencehwhichqmay_include observational_@nding§_a§~weA§
WW E'sigblishcdlawaaud.theorieEiii "suEeTiiiiiBV-Ju}195133329295-Suppose
forexaniplemtha‘tjinsupportof the hypothesis that a radiation belt of a specified
kindsurroundsthe earth, a scientist were to adduce, first, certain observational
data,obtainedperhaps by rocket-borne instruments; second, certain previously
acceptedtheoriesinvoked in the interpretationof those data; and finally, certain
judgmentsof value, such as ‘it is good to ascertain the truth’. Clearly, the
judgmentsof value would then be dismissed as lacking all logical relevance to
theproposedhypothesis since they can contribute neither to its support nor to its
disconfirmation.
Butthequestion whether science presupposes valuation in a logical sense can
beraised,and recently has been raised, in yet another way, referring more
specificallyto valuational presuppositions of scientific method. In the preceding
considerations,cientific knowledge was represented by a system of statements
whicharesuHicientlysupported by available evidence to be accepted in accord­
ancewiththe principles of scientific test and validation. We noted that as a rule
theobservationalevidence on which a scientific hypothesis is accepted is far
fromsufficientto establish that hypothesis conclusively. For example, Galileo's
lawrefersnot only to past instances of free fall near the earth, but also to all
futureones; and the latter surely are not covered by our present evidence.
Hence,Galileo’slaw, and similarly any other law in empirical science, is accepted
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on the basis of incomplete evidence. Such acceptance carries with it the“induc­
tive risk” that the presumptive law may not hold in full generality,andthat
future evidence may lead scientists to modify or abandon it.
A precise statement of this conception of scientific knowledge wouldrequire.
among other things, the formulation of rules of two kinds: First, rulesofcon­
jirmati'on, which would specify what kind of evidence is confirmatory, whatkind
disconfirmatory for a given hypothesis. Perhaps they would also determines
numerical degreeof evidential support (or confirmation, or inductiveprobability)
which a given body of evidence could be said to confer upon a proposedhypo­
thesis. Secondly, there would have to be rules qf acceptance:these would SPCde
how strong the evidential support for a given hypothesis has to be if thehypo­
thesis is to be accepted into the system of scientific knowledge; or, moregene?
ally, under what conditions a proposed hypothesis is to be accepted,underwhat
conditions it is to be rejected by science on the basis of a given body ofevidchC­
Recent studies of inductive inference and statistical testing have devoteda
great deal of effort to the formulation Of adequate rules of either kind. InPar'
ticular, rules of acceptance have been treated in many of these investigationsas
special instances of decision rules Of the sort mentioned in the precedingsection.
The decisions in question are here either to accept or to reject a proposedhypo'
thesis on the basis of given evidence. As was noted earlier, the formulation0
“adequate” decision rules requires, in any case, the antecedent specification.Of
valuations that can then serve as standards of adequacy. The “‘1ng
valuations, as will be recalled, concern the different possible outcomes of the
choices which the decision rules are to govern. Now, when a scientificrule0f
acceptance is applied to a specified hypothesis on the basis of a given bod)I0f
evidence, the possible “outcomes” Ofthe resulting decision may be dividedinto
four major types: (1) the hypothesis is accepted (as presumably true) in accordall‘?c
with the rule and is in fact true; (2) the hypothesis is rejected (as presumably
false) in accordance with the rule and is in fact false; (3) the hypothesis isaccept?d
in accordance with the rule, but is in fact false; (4) the hypothesis is rejectedIn
accordance with the rule, but is in fact true. The former two casesare W1)“
science aims to achieve; the possibility of the latter two represents the inductiVC
risk that any acceptance rule must involve. And the problem of formulating
adequate rules of acceptance and rejection has no clear meaning unlessstandade
of adequacy have been provided by assigning definite values or disvaluesto thosC
different possible “outcomes” of acceptance or rejection. It is in this sensethilt
the method 9§,?§‘_3P.1i§bing.ssisasiéc-hynathsssémteymffsi’ Valua‘i‘m‘h‘
juméetisn eithéirulcs eficcsptaricsandrejseti.qt1..rsaui£§ssafetiessial’iluc
judgments.
‘ '1 caseswhere the hypothesis under test, if accepted, is to be madethc
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basisof a specificcourse of action, the possible outcomes may lead to success
orfailureof the intended practical application; in these cases, the values and
disvaluesat stake may well be expressible in terms of monetary gains or losses;
andforsituationsof this sort, the theory of decision functions has developed
variousdecisionrules for use in practical contexts such as industrial quality
control.But when it comes to decision rules for the acceptance of hypotheses in
purescientificresearch, where no practical applications are contemplated, the
questionofhow to assign values to the four types of outcome mentioned earlier
becomesconsiderablymore problematic. Enema general way, it seems clear
diattliejtagdards_governmghthe'inductivcprocedures of pureiscience relic-c't‘the
objectiveof obtaining a certain g‘SSER’Hieh‘might-be described somewhat
vag‘EéiiEs'HiE‘ZEtZiBiB‘eriéof an increasingly reliable, extensive, and theoretically
syst‘enia'tiiedbodyof information about the world. Note that if we were con­
asystemofbeliefsorauworldviewthatisemotionally
reassuring'oresthetically satisfying to us, then it would not be reasonable at all
toinsist,assci‘eiice’dogzspgaclose accord between the beliefs we accept and our
empirifxalflvid’enc-g‘andhthestandards of objective testability and confirmation
bypubliclyasceffainable evidence would have to be replaced by acceptance
standardsof:entirelyddifferent Ihe standardsof proceduremust in each
casebeformedin consideration of the goals to be attained; their justification
niagflse‘ierativeto those goals and must, in this sense, presuppose them.
.——-.­
7.CONCLUDINGCOMPARISONS
If,as has been argued in section 4, science cannot provide a validation of
categoricalvaluejudgments,can scientific method and knowledge play any role
at all in clarifying and resolving problems of moral valuation and decisione
Theansweris emphatically in the affirmative. I will try to show this in a brief
surveyof the principal contributions science has to offer in this context.
Firstofall,sciencecan provide factual information required for the resolution
ofmoralissues.Such information will always be needed, for no matter what
systemof moral values we may espouse—whether it be egoistic or altruistic,
hedonisticor utilitarian, or of any other kind—surely the specific course of
actionitenjoinsus to follow in a given situation will depend upon the facts about
thatsituation;and it is scientific knowledge and investigation that must provide
thefactualinformation which isneeded for the application of our moral standards.
Morespecifically,factual information is needed, for example, to ascertain (a)
whethera contemplated objective can be attained in a given situation; (b) if it
canbeattained,by what alternative means and with what probabilities ;(c) what
sideeffectsand ulterior consequences the choice of a given means may have apart
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from probably yielding the desired end; (d) whether several proposedendsare
jointly realizable,or whether they are incompatibleinthe sensethat therealization
of some of them will definitely or probably prevent the realizationof others.
By thus giving us information which is indispensable as a factual basisfor
rational and responsible decision, scientific research may well motivateusto
change some of our valuations. If we were to diSCOVer,for example, thata
certain kind of goal which we had so far valued very highly could beattainedonly
at the price of seriously undesirable side effects and ulterior consequences,we
might well come to place a less high value upon that goal. Thus, more extensive
scientific information may lead to a change in our basic valuations—notby
“disconfirming” them, of course, but rather by motivating a changein our
total appraisal of the issues in question.
Secondly, and in a quite different manner, science can illuminate certain
problems of valuation by an objective psychological and sociologicalstudyof
the factors that affect the values espoused by an individual or a group; of the
ways in which such valuational commitments change; and perhapsof the
manner in which the espousal of a given value system may contribute to the
emotional security of an individual or to the functional stability of a group.
Psychological, anthropological, and sociological studies of valuational
behavior cannot, of course, "validate" any system of moral standards.Buttheir
results can psychologically effect changes in our outlook on moral issuesby
broadening our horizons, by making us aware of alternatives not envisaged,or
not embraced, by our own group, and by thus providing some safeguard
against moral dogmatism or parochialism.
Finally, a comparison with certain fundamental aspects of scientificknowledge
may help to illuminate some further questions concerning valuation.
If we grant that scientific hypotheses and theories are always open to revision
in the light of new empirical evidence, are we not obliged to assumethat there
is another class of scientific statements which cannot be open to doubt andre­
consideration, namely, the observational statements describing experiential
findings that serve to test scientific theoriese Those simple, straightforward
reports of what has been directly observed in the laboratory or in scientificfield
work, for example—must they not be regarded as immune from any conceivable
revision, as irrevocable once they have been established by direct observation!
Reports on directly observed phenomena have indeed often been consideredas
an unshakable bedrock foundation for all scientific hypotheses and theories.
Yet this conception is untenable; even here, we find no definitive, unquestionable
certainty.
For, first of all, accounts of what has been directly observed are subjecto
error that may spring from various physiological and psychological sources.
Scienceand Human Values [9 5]
Indeed,it isoftenpossible to check on the accuracy of a given observation report
bycomparingit with the reports made by other observers, or with relevant data
obtainedby some indirect procedure, such as a motion picture taken of the
finishofahorserace; and such comparison may lead to the rejection of what had
previouslybeen considered as a correct description of a directly observed
phenomenon.We even have theories that enable us to explain and anticipate some
typesofobservationalerror, and in such cases, there is no hesitation to question
andto rejectcertain statements that purport simply to record what has been
directlyobserved.
Sometimesrelatively isolated experimental findings may conflict with a
theorythatis strongly supported by a large number and variety of other data;
inthiscase,it may well happen that part of the conflicting data, rather than the
theory,is refusedadmission into the system of accepted scientific statements—
evenif no satisfactory explanation of the presumptive error of observation is
available.In such cases it is not the isolated observational finding which decides
whetherthe theory is to remain in good standing, but it is the previously well­
substantiatedtheory which determines whether a purported observation report
isto be regarded as describing an actual empirical occurrence. For example, a
reporthatduring a spiritualistic séance, a piece of furniture freely floated above
thefloorwould normally be rejected because of its conflict with extremely
wellconfirmedphysical principles, even in the absence of some specific explana­
tionofthereport, say, in terms of deliberate fraud by the medium, or of high
suggestibilityon the part of the observer. Similarly, the experimental findings
reportedby the physicist Ehrenhaft, which were claimed to refute the principle
thatallelectriccharges are integral multiples of the charge of the electron, did
notleadto the overthrow, nor even to a slight modification, of that principle,
whichisan integral part of a theory with extremely strong and diversified ex­
perimentalsupport. Needless to say, such rejection of alleged observation
reportsby reasonof their conflict with well-established theories requires consid­
erablecaution; otherwise, a theory, once accepted, could be used to reject all
adverseevidence that might subsequently be found—a dogmatic procedure
entirelyirreconcilablewith the objectives and the spirit of scientific inquiry.
Evenreports on directly observed phenomena, then, are not irrevocable;
theyprovideno bedrock foundation for the entire system of scientificknowledge.
Butthisby no means precludes the possibility of testing scientific theories by
referenceto data obtained through direct observation. As we noted, the results
obtainedby suchdirect checking cannot be considered as absolutely unquestion­
ableandirrevocable; they are themselves amenable to further tests which may
becarriedout if there is reason for doubt. But obviously if we are ever to form
anybeliefsabout the world, if we are ever to accept or to reject, even provisionally,
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some hypothesis or theory, then we must stop the testing processsomewhere;
we must accept some evidential statements as sufficiently trustworthy notto
require further investigation for the time being. And on the basisofsuchevidence,
we can then decide what credence to give to the hypothesis under test,and
whether to accept or to reject it.
This aspect of scientific investigation seems to me to have a parallelin the
case of sound valuation and rational decision. In order to make a rationalchoice
between several courses of action, we have to consider, first of all, whatcon­
sequences each of the different alternative choices is likely to have. Thisaffords
a basis for certain relative judgments of value that are relevant to our problem.
If this set of results is to be attained, this course of action ought to be chosen;if
that other set of results is to be realized, we should choose such and suchanother
course; and so forth. But in order to arrive at a decision, we stillhave to decide
upon the relative values of the alternative sets of consequences attainabletous;
and this, aswas noted earlier, callsfor the acceptance of an unconditionaljudgment
of value, which will then determine our choice. But such acceptanceneednot
be regarded as definitive and irrevocable, as forever binding for all our future
decisions: an unconditional judgment of value, once accepted, still remainsopen
to reconsideration and to change. Suppose, for example, that we haveto choose,
as voters or as members of a city administration, between several alternative
social policies, some of which are designed to improve certain materialconditions
of living, whereas others aim at satisfying cultural needs of various kinds.Ifwe
are to arrive at a decision at all, we will have to commit ourselves to assigning
a higher value to one or the other of those objectives. But while thejudgment
thus accepted serves as an unconditional and basic judgment of value for the
decision at hand, we are not for that reason committed to it forever—wemay
well reconsider our standards and reverse our judgment later on; and though
this cannot undo the earlier decision, it will lead to different decisionsin the
future. Thus, if we are to arrive at a decision concerning a moral issue,we have
to accept some unconditional judgments of value; but these need not beregarded
as ultimate in the absolute sense of being forever binding for all our decisions,
any more than the evidence statements relied on in the test of a scientifichypothesis
need to be regarded as forever irrevocable. All that is needed in either contextare
relativeultimates, asit were: aset of judgments—moral or descriptive—whichare
accepted at the time as not in need of further scrutiny. These relative ultimates
permit us to keep an open mind in regard to the possibility of making changes
in our heretofore unquestioned commitments and beliefs; and surely the ex­
perience of the past suggests that if we are to meet the challenge of the present
and the future, we will more than ever need undogmatic, critical, and openminds.
